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A SKEPTIC’S VIEW OF BENEFIT CORPORATIONS 
Kent Greenfield∗ 
The harm that can flow from businesses pursuing profits above all else has 
become more obvious over the last few years. The global financial crisis, the 
Deep Horizon well disaster, and the factory collapse of Bangladesh all show 
the dangers of allowing businesses to focus on profit while ignoring 
externalities and potential risks. 
We are in the midst of a historical moment in which some of the core ideas 
of business, and of the law that governs it, is being reconsidered. What are 
corporations for? Do they owe responsibilities to stakeholders other than 
shareholders? To society in general? 
There is something of a bandwagon effect occurring now around the notion 
that a narrow focus in corporate boardrooms on shareholder interest and 
shareholder profit is not only bad for society as a whole but also bad for 
shareholders. An article in the Harvard Business Review last year proclaimed 
that “there’s a growing body of evidence . . . that the companies that are most 
successful at maximizing shareholder value over time are those that aim 
toward goals other than maximizing shareholder value. Employees and 
customers often know more about and have more of a long-term commitment 
to a company than shareholders do.”1 Joe Nocera, a popular, non-business, 
essayist in The New York Times wrote that “it feels as if we are at the dawn of 
a new movement—one aimed at overturning the hegemony of shareholder 
value.”2 
This rethinking is most obvious around the issue of “benefit corporations,” 
a new type of business classification increasingly popular around the country. 
Benefit corporations are for-profit corporations that are also required to create 
“a material, positive impact on society and the environment and to meet higher 
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 1 Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good Are Shareholders?, 90 HARV. BUS. REV. 49, 57 (2012). 
 2 Joe Nocera, Down with Shareholder Value, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/11/opinion/nocera-down-with-shareholder-value.html?_r=0. 
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standards of accountability and transparency.”3 At the time of this writing, 
eighteen states—including Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont—have 
adopted legislation allowing corporations to opt-in to the benefit corporation 
framework of obligations. Even Delaware, the most popular state for business 
incorporations, recently adopted a benefit corporation statute. 
The supporters of benefit corporations argue that the framework will 
liberate businesses from the market demands of Wall Street and the legal 
demands of shareholder plaintiffs seeking to hold management accountable for 
decisions that fail to put shareholder interests first. They also say that 
companies choosing the status can brand themselves as green and society-
minded. (Patagonia recently opted-in to benefit corporation status, a good test 
for this branding strategy.) 
My own work as a legal scholar for almost two decades has focused on the 
very problems that motivate the move toward benefit corporations. I believe 
short-term shareholder focus creates risks for both corporations and society. I 
have argued that the fiduciary duties of corporations and their managers should 
run toward a broader set of the company stakeholders. 
But I am a skeptic of benefit corporations. Here’s why. 
* They are voluntary. Once corporations opt-in to the framework, a set of 
requirements kick in. But the decision to opt-in is voluntary, which means that 
the corporations that most need the strictures of the framework are the least 
likely to opt-in. 
* They are based on a misreading of the law. Under current law, courts 
are quite deferential to the decisions of management. Under the “business 
judgment rule,” courts will only set aside the decisions of management if they 
are tainted with self-interest or grossly misinformed. (And then only rarely.) So 
under current law, if a board wants to support charitable causes, pay employees 
more, or voluntarily reduce pollutive emissions, there is no doubt that they can 
do so without fearing legal recourse. 
* They don’t add much. What’s more, most states make this freedom 
explicit in the corporate statute. In Massachusetts, for example, the statute for 
run-of-the mill business corporations includes a provision stating that directors 
may, in discharging their duties, “consider the interests of the corporation’s 
employees, suppliers, creditors and customers, the economy of the state, the 
 
 3 BENEFIT CORP INFORMATION CENTER (Jan. 11, 2014), http://www.benefitcorp.net.  
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region and the nation, community and societal considerations, and the long-
term and short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders.”4 The 
problem, then, is not that managers are not permitted to act with an an eye 
toward society. The problem is that they are not required to do so. Benefits 
corporation statutes do not solve this problem. 
* They do not protect companies from market pressure. Because not all 
companies will choose to become benefit corporations, those that do will suffer 
competitive disadvantage in the capital market, at least in the short term. Some 
shareholders may accept the lower returns implicit in the benefit corporation 
framework, but most will not. So the cost of capital will be higher for benefit 
corporations than for their non-benefit competitors. The problem with this is 
that over time, a focus on values other than shareholder profit will appear to be 
hurtful to a company’s fortunes. The way to make sure attentiveness to social 
needs won’t hurt a company? Level the playing field to mandate such 
attentiveness by all corporations. This, of course, is not what benefit 
corporation statutes do. 
* They might embolden other companies to act poorly. Advocates of 
benefit corporations say that without such a framework, companies might be 
punished for doing the right thing. As I explain above, I think that’s a 
misreading of the law. But a lot of people believe it, and the creation of benefit 
corporation statutes will strengthen the misconception. The result? Companies 
that do not choose to become benefit corporations—that is, most of them—will 
be able to say to shareholder, consumer, and community activists that they 
should take their concerns elsewhere. In a way, a company’s decision to not 
choose benefit corporation status will amount to a branding strategy as well, 
but the opposite of what the benefit corporation stands for. Wall Street will 
love it, and managers of those companies will be encouraged to act even worse 
than they do now. 
* They distract from other, more fundamental changes. You’ve guessed 
by now that my problem with benefit corporations is not that they do too much 
but that they do too little. There are a range of more fundamental changes to 
corporate governance that are attainable in this historical moment, and I fear 
that an emphasis on benefit corporations will take the air out of the reform 
balloon. We could require all corporations to take into account the concerns 
and interests of all their important stakeholders; we could require corporations 
 
 4 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, § 8.30 (2004). 
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to tell the truth to their employees; we could require major corporations to 
include employee representatives on their boards, as is the case in many 
countries in Europe. These changes in corporate governance could create 
significant benefits to corporations and to society more broadly. A statute 
creating a new framework for some companies, and only those that choose it, 
is merely treading water. 
* They might create weird free speech implications. Finally, I have an 
additional worry created by recent Supreme Court cases about free speech. The 
Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 
protected the First Amendment rights of for-profit corporations to engage in 
political activity. Ten years earlier, the Court ruled in Boy Scouts v. Dale that 
some non-profits have a First Amendment right to have anti-discrimination 
laws not apply to them, if the forced inclusion of certain individuals would be 
against the group’s beliefs. Now consider how these cases could work together 
in the context of a benefit corporation that stated a belief that, for example, 
homosexuality is an abomination (remember a certain fast-food chicken 
sandwich company?) or that the Affordable Care Act’s mandate that 
companies provide health insurance that includes contraceptive care violates 
their belief in the sanctity of life. I think it is a reasonable fear that companies 
organized as benefit corporations could, if they chose to, claim a First 
Amendment-based exception to otherwise applicable anti-discrimination laws 
or insurance mandates. This would certainly be an unintended consequence of 
the benefit corporation statutes, but I think it is a real possibility that 
corporations win such cases in the near future.5 
So all in all, I believe the motivation behind benefit corporations is nothing 
but laudable. I, too, believe that we need to figure out how to rein in the worst 
excesses of corporations, while empowering corporations and those who 
manage them to act with a broader and more robust sense of fiduciary duty. I, 
too, believe the current legal framework contains fundamental flaws. 
 
 5 See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 
F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding, 2–1, that corporations may not claim Free Exercise rights), cert. granted, 
134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). For a discussion concerning a corporation’s nonfinancial interests, see id. at 389–405 
(Jordan, J., dissenting) (arguing that some corporations have interests beyond the financial, pointing to benefit 
corporations to “undermine the narrow view that all for-profit corporations are concerned with profit 
maximization alone.”). Conestoga Wood has been consolidated for Supreme Court review with Sebelius v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013); the cases were argued on March 25, 2014, but yet 
decided at the time of this writing. 
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But I am skeptical of the power of benefit corporation statutes to make 
genuine advances here. If we are in need of a genuine re-thinking, I think we 
need to be bolder. 
 
